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Abstract
This study investigates the impact of managerial ability on banks’ liquidity creation and risk-
taking behavior. We find that higher ability managers create more liquidity and take more risk.
During financial crisis times, however, higher ability bank managers reduce liquidity creation as a
way to de-leverage their balance sheets. Our findings inform recent theoretical and empirical stud-
ies that investigate determinants of liquidity creation and risk by introducing managerial ability
as a prominent antecedent of the banks’ intermediation and risk-transforming service. Moreover,
this study has policy-related implications, since managerial ability can be quantified as a key
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1. Introduction
Bank intermediation, as facilitated by liquidity creation, is one of the central services banks provide
for the economy. Surprisingly, this core function of banks has only recently received attention in
the empirical literature (see, for example, Berger and Bouwman, 2009). Similarly, the impact of
managerial ability on a firm’s outcome has long been ignored, under the assumption that managers are
largely homogeneous entities that follow identical goals. Only recently has this view been challenged
by a growing body of literature that recognizes the impact that managers have on firm performance
(see, for example, Bamber, Jiang, and Wang, 2010; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Demerjian, Lev,
and McVay, 2012). Understanding the link between managerial ability and bank intermediation is
important, especially for policy-makers and regulators. This study is the first to contribute to this
discussion by investigating the impact of managerial ability on bank liquidity creation. Since risk
transformation may coincide with liquidity creation, this paper also makes assertions regarding the
impact of managerial ability on bank risk-taking behavior.
The main goals of this study are twofold. Firstly, we investigate whether managerial ability has a
positive impact on bank liquidity creation. More ably managed banks have, for example, been found
to report higher quality earnings (see, for example, Cantrell, 2013). Higher ability managers are
also found to decisively influence corporate outcomes (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Choi, Han, Jung,
and Kang, 2015; Dejong and Ling, 2013) and to positively affect firm performance (see, for example,
Demerjian, Lev, and McVay, 2012) in industrial firms. Liquidity creation is a key feature of a bank’s
outcome and has been shown to be positively related to bank performance (Berger and Bouwman,
2009). Hence it is reasonable to assume that more able managers will leverage their bank’s assets
to create greater liquidity, aiming for higher performance. Therefore, we hypothesize that more able
managers create more liquidity. In addition, we postulate that, because of their superior ability, more
able bank managers can better manage, and in fact do take, more risk. This is a natural corollary
to the above argumentation since, as shown in Berger and Bouwman (2009), banks’ risk-taking is
linked to liquidity creation, as for example when banks issue risk-less liquidity deposits to finance
risky illiquid loans.
Secondly, we investigate the link between managerial ability and liquidity expansion or contraction
caused by adverse economic shocks, such as the ones evidenced during the recent financial crisis. On
the managerial ability ambit, Andreou, Ehrlich, Karasamani, and Louca (2015) find that higher abil-
ity managers invest more during the recent financial crisis period compared to their less able peers,
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because they reduce the information asymmetry gap with the markets and have greater capacity to
access financing resources; this evidence lends support to the notion that managerial ability effective-
ness is heightened during such periods. On the bank intermediation ambit, Bebchuk and Goldstein
(2011) develop a theory to support the hypothesis that it may be individually optimal for banks to
curtail their intermediation activity in the face of negative shocks to the economy. In this respect,
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) report that loans extended by banks to large borrowers were signif-
icantly reduced during the recent financial crisis. However, Berger and Bouwman (2014) (see also
discussions in Berger and Bouwman, 2009, 2013) present empirical evidence to the contrary. Their
collective findings indicate that some banks may even increase liquidity creation during crises and
that such an increase improves these banks’ value creation and competitiveness. This suggests that
during crises managers under certain conditions may have incentives to expand the intermediation
activity. Banks led by more able managers should therefore be in a much better position to either
contract or expand liquidity in crises, if it is indeed optimal for them to do so. In this paper, we
develop arguments that lead to testable hypotheses that take into account the divergent views in the
literature. As previously, it is again reasonable to consider a corollary risk-taking hypothesis that
emerges from the banks’ liquidity creation behavior; hence we hypothesize as to whether higher ability
bank managers take more or less risk during the financial crisis.
Our empirical tests utilize data from virtually every US bank from 1994 to 2010, comprising 100,976
bank-year observations. Berger and Bouwman (2009) show that liquidity creation differs considerably
among large banks (those with gross total assets (GTA) exceeding $3 billion), medium banks (those
with GTA of $1 billion to $3 billion), and small banks (those with GTA up to $1 billion). There-
fore, since size differences among banks are substantial in terms of liquidity creation, our empirical
mediation also takes into account these three size groups separately. With respect to bank liquidity
creation, we rely on the main measure as operationalized in the seminal work of Berger and Bouwman
(2009), which accounts for a bank’s liquidity creation due to on- and off-balance-sheet activities. To
quantify managerial ability, we elaborate on the methodological ideas in Demerjian, Lev, and McVay
(2012), adjusted however to the banking environment confronted in our study. In particular, we
employ stochastic frontier analysis to compare bank managers’ efficiency relative to their industry
peers regarding the transformation of corporate resources to profits, a process that is in line with the
important tenet of a profit-maximizing firm. Managerial ability is then estimated out of the efficiency
scores after taking into account a large array of bank-specific characteristics that cannot be attributed
to the management team.
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For our empirical analysis, we regress bank liquidity creation and risk measures on the lagged man-
agerial ability while controlling for other bank-related characteristics that may affect those dependent
variables. We use the dollar amount of bank liquidity divided by GTA as our measure of bank liquid-
ity creation, since, as explained in Berger and Bouwman (2009), it is necessary to make the liquidity
measure meaningful and comparable across banks, while avoiding to give undue weight to the largest
institutions. Regarding risk measures, we rely on the widely applied risk proxies that capture a bank’s
fragility such as the: (i) tier 1 ratio calculated as tier 1 capital divided by risk weighted assets using
Basel II rules, (ii) risk-weighted assets divided by GTA, and (iii) Z-Score, which captures distance
from default. To avoid omitted variables, we include (depending on the regression specification) a
large array of control variables, such as risk, size, bank holding company membership, merger and
acquisition history, local market competition, economic environment, and bank cost efficiency score.
In the empirical investigations of our hypotheses, for all of the variables relating to managerial ability
and other bank characteristics, we use lagged values rather than contemporaneous values to mitigate
endogeneity concerns that may arise from reverse causality.
Consistent with our hypotheses, the results show that managerial ability is significantly positively
related to liquidity creation for small and medium-sized banks as well as for the overall sample.
We also find that, for the case of medium and large banks, higher managerial ability contributes
significantly to the riskiness of the bank. For small banks, this relation is reversed; yet, this can
be rationalized since small banks are confronted with very different incentives, funding constraints
and regulatory scrutiny, which may force higher managerial ability bank managers to handle risk
differently from their peers who lead larger-sized banks. Regarding the effects of managerial ability
on liquidity creation and risk-taking during the financial crisis, findings reveal that more able managers
significantly reduce both their banks’ liquidity and risk during this period. A large set of robustness
checks regarding the definition of the liquidity creation measure, alternative construction methods
for the managerial ability measure, and various treatments for endogeneity concerns reveal that our
results remain unchanged and provide qualitatively similar conclusions.
The results in this paper contribute to the understanding of the banking industry in several im-
portant ways. This is the first study to investigate the impact of managerial ability on the liquidity
creation of banks. It is also the first study that links bank risk-taking to the ability of managers.
These findings offer a nexus of vital information to assess banks following the CAMELS rating cri-
teria.1 Moreover, our findings provide valuable evidence regarding the impact of financial crises on
1CAMELS is an acronym for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity
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bank liquidity creation and risk-taking through the channel of managerial ability. Our study adds to
the body of evidence provided by recent papers such as, for example, those of Berger and Bouwman
(2009) and Berger and Bouwman (2014), which aim to understand what drives bank liquidity creation
and risk-taking, among other things.
This paper is also of particular interest to policy-makers, since it can inform decisions on the
allocation of supervision resources and support funding, especially in times of crises. In this respect,
since managerial ability is found to exert a significant impact on bank liquidity creation, it has the
potential to act as an important performance indicator for regulators. Distinguishing between more or
less ably managed banks would enable the regulator to target intervention efforts more purposefully.
Additionally, since managerial ability has a clear link to risk-taking behavior, it can further inform the
prudential supervision of banks. Information about factors that facilitate intermediation activity and
risk-taking becomes even more valuable in times of crisis. In such times, regulator- and supervision-
monitoring need to trade-off moral hazard concerns against the risk of premature liquidation of
positive NPV projects by banks, which may lead to financial contagion between banks. Thus, if
managerial ability can predict liquidity creation and risk of banks during crises, the policy-maker
may wish to consider this when deciding which banks to support and which to allow to fail.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the various strands of the literature
and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the construction of the managerial ability measure for
banks. The empirical analyses are reported in Section 4, while Section 5 discusses various robustness
checks. Section 6 concludes.
2. Review of the Literature and Development of Hypotheses
This section discusses the literature underpinning the subsequent analysis. Firstly, we summarize the
growing literature related to managerial ability and its importance for firm organizational outcomes.
Secondly, we discuss liquidity creation and risk-taking behavior of banks. Finally, this discussion
motivates predictions about the impact of managerial ability on liquidity creation and risk-taking.
2.1. The Importance of Managerial Ability for Firm Outcomes
Where the impact of firm management is concerned, mainstream finance and accounting research has
largely followed the neoclassical paradigm, which leaves only limited space for manager idiosyncrasies
to market risk. As discussed for example in Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (1999), the "Management"
component specifically targets the quality of bank management.
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(Berk and Stanton, 2007). The agency theoretical paradigm, frequently encountered in banking,
relaxes the stringency of the neoclassical view, but still posits that individuals are more or less
homogeneous and merely react rationally to the regulations and incentives that surround them (see
Bamber, Jiang, and Wang, 2010, for further discussion).
The management literature, on the other hand, has long emphasized the importance of managers
for the outcomes achieved by the enterprise. One theoretical approach that has formalized reasons for
the pervasiveness of management factors in driving success is summarized by Hambrick and Mason’s
(1984) and Hambrick’s (2007) upper echelons theory. This theory predicts that the complexity of
actual decision-making situations necessitates an idiosyncratic importance of the top management
team. Hence a growing literature attempts to investigate the importance of managers for firm out-
comes. For instance, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that managers influence their organization’s
behavior over and above time- and firm-specific characteristics. Management ability has been shown
to have a distinct effect on a firm’s disclosure policies, accounting behavior and reporting quality
incrementally to the effects driven from the firm and environment characteristics (see, for example,
Bamber, Jiang, and Wang, 2010, Ge, Matsumoto, and Zhang, 2011, Dejong and Ling, 2013, Choi,
Han, Jung, and Kang, 2015, among others). Similarly, Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora (2006) find
that CEO compensation is systematically linked to talent, which indicates that the ability of man-
agers is recognized by the firm. Moreover, Leverty and Grace (2012) suggest that managerial ability
is important and economically significant in terms of influencing firm performance. Finally, Beatty
and Liao (2011) find that more ably managed banks forecast loan losses better and thus recognize
these earlier. Thus, the recent literature shows the importance of manager idiosyncrasies for firm
policies and performance.
2.2. Liquidity Creation and Risk-taking
Bank liquidity creation is widely considered as one of the main raisons d’être for intermediaries.
Liquidity creation is the ability of banks to transform more liquid liabilities into less liquid assets and
many small units of deposits into fewer larger units of loans. The extent to which banks are able to do
this is reflected in the overall amount of liquidity created. In the simplest sense, banks create liquidity
when they use short-term liabilities to fund long-term assets as is, for example, the case when demand
deposits are used to fund commercial and industrial loans. In this case, depositors maintain easy and
immediate access to their funds, while firms receive liquidity for a longer contractually defined time
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period. This liquidity transformation process involves banks taking more risk, although the amount
of liquidity created does not always move in tandem with the amount of risk piled up in the process.
The loan portfolios maintained by the banks reflect the bank manager’s trade-off between risk and
performance in a unique way. In other words, bank managers balance profit and wealth maximization
objectives against their appetite for risk. They do so by choosing optimal sources of funding and
the corresponding allocations for those funds, according to the risk-performance characteristics of the
available assets and liabilities. This process ultimately determines the quantity of liquidity created.
In this respect, Berger and Bouwman (2009) go on to show that it is primarily large banks that create
liquidity, and that liquidity creation is inextricably linked to bank riskiness, it is value-relevant and
sensitive to crises. Berger and Bouwman (2013) also find that banks that were better capitalized and
thus more resilient prior to and during financial crises benefited with respect to their market share in
terms of liquidity creation as well as value creation, post crisis.
Recent work by Berger and Bouwman (2009) provides an operational measure of liquidity creation,
hereinafter CATFAT , which is used in this study. To obtain this measure, all assets and liabilities
are categorized (hence the CAT acronym) by the effort, duration and cost required to liquidate a
given asset or liability in the market. The measure is constructed on the premise that if a liability (an
asset) is easy (difficult) to liquidate quickly at low (high) cost, the position contributes to liquidity
creation. Following Berger and Bouwman (2009), we define three classes for the assets and liabilities,
and then assign heuristic weights of 12 , 0 or −12 to each class, according to whether it is deemed to
create liquidity, be neutral, or destroy liquidity. This heuristic choice of weights reflects the postulate
that maximum liquidity of unity should be created or destroyed if a liquid liability is used to create
an illiquid asset or vice versa. Semiliquid assets and liabilities are assigned zero weights, so as to
err on the side of caution in terms of the classification procedure outlined above. The CATFAT
measure also includes off-balance-sheet items in the analysis (hence the FAT acronym). Thus, this
procedure is logically consistent, while being more refined than the simple description of bank liquidity
creation provided initially by Deep and Schaefer (2004) since it allows for the destruction of liquidity,
takes into account medium term assets and liabilities, and explicitly recognizes the importance of
off-balance-sheet items.2
2Berger and Bouwman (2009) also carry out tests where off-balance-sheet items are omitted (CATNONFAT ) or
where assets and liabilities are categorized purely based on their maturity (MATFAT, MATNONFAT ). However,
their investigation shows that the CATFAT measure is best able to capture bank liquidity creation.
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2.3. Development of Hypotheses
The discussion in Section 2.1 has shown that more able managers tend to run more successful firms
(see, for example, Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Bamber, Jiang, and Wang, 2010 and Ge, Matsumoto,
and Zhang, 2011). By the same token, banks managed by more able top management teams can
also be expected to display a superior performance. As discussed in Section 2.2, one key feature
of bank performance is the creation of liquidity. Hence it seems reasonable to suppose that more
ably managed banks will also create more liquidity. Notice that this hypothesis does not require the
assumption that managers explicitly target liquidity creation. It simply relies on the superior funding
and allocation choices made by more able managers. This claim has so far not been investigated in
the empirical or theoretical literature and motivates the first hypothesis:
H1: Ability-Liquidity hypothesis: More (less) ably managed banks create more (less) liquidity per
dollar of assets.
A second important question concerns the impact that more able managers have on bank risk-
taking. Intuitively, more able managers should be confident in their ability to take desirable, controlled
risk in the process of creating more liquidity. Hence, one might expect that more able managers will
also be found to take more risk overall and this motivates the second hypothesis:
H2: Ability-Risk hypothesis: More (less) ably managed banks take greater (lesser) risk.
Notice that this hypothesis is a corollary to the first. Broadly speaking, if creating more liquidity
involves borrowing short and lending long, banks that create more liquidity should be more risky.
Thus, if hypothesis H1 finds support in the data we should expect hypothesis H2 to be supported as
well.
Another interesting question relates to the interplay between managerial ability and liquidity cre-
ation as well as that between managerial ability and risk during times of crisis. Forming a reasonable
prior about the impact that managerial ability is likely to have on liquidity creation in crisis times is
not straightforward. On the one hand, the collective findings of Berger and Bouwman (2009, 2013)
document that banks that were well capitalized and expanded their liquidity creation market share
during and post crises were able to benefit in terms of value creation. This suggests that there is
an incentive for managers to increase liquidity creation during crises in order to take advantage of
subsequent value gains. Ceteris paribus, more able managers should be better able to exploit these
opportunities. It follows that one ought to expect more ably managed banks to expand liquidity
creation during crises. On the other hand, the theory of Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011) suggests the
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opposite. More specifically, in an economy where the success of loans to industrial firms depends on
the overall volume of loans extended by banks, it may be individually rational for banks to reduce
intermediation activity following a negative shock to the economy. This follows from each bank’s
expectation that other banks will also curtail their intermediation activity and hence failure rates
among industrial firms will be high. The financial crisis would certainly qualify as such a negative
shock. Therefore one can argue that it is individually optimal for banks to reduce intermediation
activity in this case. Again, more able managers should be expected to react more effectively in order
to protect their banks from risk. Hence, to capture the opposing views in the literature, the third
hypothesis has two propositions:
H3a: Ability-Liquidity Expansion hypothesis: More ably managed banks increase liquidity cre-
ation per dollar of assets during crisis times.
H3b: Ability-Liquidity Contraction hypothesis: More ably managed banks decrease liquidity
creation per dollar of assets during crisis times.
Finally, crisis events are frequently marked by a flight to quality and de-leveraging, respectively (see,
for example, Brunnermeier, 2009). Angelopoulos and Georgopoulos (2015) also report that the crisis
reverses the generally positive value effect of income diversification and intensifies the value premium
of efficient cost management. This is the natural reaction of a bank to adverse economic shocks
because it serves to protect its valuable charter from the impact of the shock. Ceteris paribus, more
able managers should be in a better position to actively respond to such a shock by de-leveraging. On
the contrary, Beatty and Liao (2011) show that better managers, those who write down nonperforming
loans in a more timely fashion, experience considerably fewer reductions in lending during recessionary,
relative to expansionary, periods. This suggests that the risk that has been taken by managers of
greater ability has been reliably estimated beforehand and need not be hidden from outsiders by, for
example, rolling over bad loans (see, for example, Aghion, Bolton, and Fries, 1999; Mitchell, 2001).
At the same time, while there can be instances where banks do not create liquidity, they may still
provide a valuable risk-transformation service for the economy (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). Due
to the divergent views in the literature on the relation between liquidity creation and the banks’ risk
behavior during crisis times, the fourth hypothesis again has two components:
H4a: Ability-Risk Expansion hypothesis: More ably managed banks increase risk during crisis
times.
H4b: Ability-Risk Contraction hypothesis: More ably managed banks decrease risk during crisis
times.
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3. Estimating Managerial Ability for Banks
For a long time, managerial ability, being latent, has been a very challenging concept to operationalize
empirically. Thus the focus of prior literature has been first on CEO fixed effects (Bertrand and
Schoar, 2003), second on CEO press visibility (Francis, Huang, Rajgopal, and Zang, 2008) and third
on firm performance (Barr, Seiford, and Siems, 1993; Barr and Siems, 1997; Leverty and Grace,
2012). Constructing CEO fixed effects requires firm and manager observations over time. However,
the availability of the required data is limited and favors large firms. The same holds for press visibility,
where a substantial bias towards large and listed firms is likely. Furthermore, managerial turnover
may coincide with circumstances that are otherwise problematic for the firm and may thus be a
fuzzy measure of managerial ability (Bennedsen, Pérez-González, and Wolfenzon, 2006). In addition,
focusing on only the CEO ability ignores the fact that it is most probably the top management team as
a whole that drives firm outcomes, as argued, for example by Hambrick (2007). Studies that use firm
performance measures as proxies for managerial ability use either firm efficiency, parameterized using
data envelopment analysis, or firm profitability as proxies for the ability of management. However,
it is clear that these proxies are not likely to be very precise, since firm efficiency and profitability
subsume influences that are not due to management but rather to the firm itself, such as, for instance,
the ability to operate at optimal scale, functional organizational structures, the goodwill of clients that
has accrued to the institution over its lifespan, bargain power due to size, etc. Therefore mainstream
research on managerial ability has heretofore been hampered in breadth and accuracy by the lack of a
measure of managerial ability that reliably disentangles it from other factors and is readily available
for large numbers of firms.
An important contribution that can be used to parameterize managerial ability more effectively is
made by Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012), who construct a broad and valid measure of managerial
ability that can be obtained with relatively frugal data requirements. Specifically, they realize that
only the portion of firm success not due to firm-specific characteristics ought to be attributed to
managers. In order to capture a broad measure of firm success, the authors turn to a relative measure
of firm performance, efficiency. This concept, also known as X-efficiency, has been widely applied
to measure the performance of banks (Hughes and Mester, 2015). Thus, for instance, Berger and
Humphrey (1997) document 130 studies that have applied the efficiency concept so as to capture
bank performance. X-efficiency quantifies a bank’s performance relative to a frontier that is spanned
by the institutions active in the market. Together these institutions define the technology of the
10
banking industry, i.e. the efficient frontier. Banks that operate in a fully efficient manner will find
themselves on the frontier while inefficient banks will fall short. This concept and the attendant
parameterization methods, most notably data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier
analysis (SFA), have attracted substantial attention in the literature, as they allow insights into the
determinants of efficiency (see, for example, Berger, 2003; Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006; Feng
and Serletis, 2010; Mester, 1997; Wheelock and Wilson, 2001). Thus Demerjian, Lev, and McVay
(2012) use revenue efficiency as their raw measure of firm success and then purge this measure of all
firm-specific effects. Revenue efficiency indicates the ability to generate revenues with a given bundle
of inputs and outputs relative to other similar firms and they use this as their basis of managerial
ability. Managerial ability is then obtained by running Tobit regressions of the raw efficiency scores
on characteristics that are assumed to be specific to the firm and outside the manager’s influence.
Given its wide coverage, the resulting measure of managerial ability particularly lends itself to the
study of the US banking industry, where a majority of banks are small, not covered by the financial
press and not publicly traded. Therefore we rely on the methodological ideas as in Demerjian, Lev,
and McVay (2012) to operationalize managerial ability in the banking industry.
Our estimation methodology for the managerial ability measure proceeds in two steps. The first step
is to compute bank profit efficiency using SFA. While Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) use DEA to
obtain firm-level efficiency, we favor SFA because DEA has the disadvantage of being deterministic,
i.e. unable to accommodate noise in the measurement of input, output and price variables. SFA
does not require the data to be observed without errors. However, it does postulate a functional
form that underlies the production process. A number of studies in banking have shown that the
common parameterizations, such as the Translog, can capture profit, cost and revenue efficiency,
hence we focus on this method (Altunbas and Chakravarty, 2001; Berger, 2003; Mester, 1997). We
do, however, examine results obtained by way of DEA in the robustness checks and find our conclusions
qualitatively unaffected. Since profitability is likely to be the main motivation of bank owners and by
extension bank managers, we focus on computing profit efficiency as our basis for bank performance,
instead of the revenue efficiency as in Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012). The second step of the
estimation methodology is to purge the efficiency scores of any bank-specific influences that cannot
be attributed to the management team. This is accomplished by running a Tobit regression of the
efficiency scores on a set of bank characteristics.
This section proceeds as follows: Section 3.1 discusses the calculation of efficiency scores for banks
as the main ingredient to managerial ability, while Section 3.2 provides evidence on the plausibility
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of the managerial ability proxy used in this analysis.
3.1. Quantifying Managerial Ability
The first step in obtaining the managerial ability measure relies on the use of stochastic frontiers in
the analysis of firm efficiency that traces its lineage to Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977). Since
then, numerous studies have applied this method in various industries to compute the X-efficiency of
firms (see Hughes and Mester (2015) for a review). In general the aim is to parameterize an efficient
frontier by utilizing information about how firms use the resources (inputs and outputs) available to
them.
Profit efficiency measures how well a bank is generating profits by using its inputs and outputs
relative to best practice banks on the efficient frontier. However, especially among small banks,
which comprise the vast majority of the US banking landscape, but also among banks more generally,
some standard assumptions of conventional efficiency measurement methods are unlikely to hold.
Specifically, we expect there to be limits to disposability for certain inputs and outputs, noise in the
measurement of output prices, some degree of at least local market power and substantial differences
in the quality of banking services. Therefore we follow Berger and Mester (1997) in applying the
alternative profit efficiency approach as the main tool for our analysis. This approach accounts for
the issues mentioned above and parameterizes the efficient frontier in terms of input prices and output
levels, instead of input and output prices. Below we explain the specifics of the approach.
The estimation is based on the model that assumes that the total level of profit can be described
as follows:
pii = s(yi,wi,β) exp (i). (1)
In the above equation, s(.) is the deterministic kernel of the profit creation function, yi is the M × 1
output bundle of bank i, wi represents the N input prices faced by the ith bank and pii is the total
profit generated by this bank, which can be computed by way of w′ixi, where xi represents the
N × 1 input vector of the ith bank. i = vi − ui is the composed error term, where vi is assumed
∼ iidN(0, σ2v) and represents the random influences of the environment the bank operates in. The
nonnegative inefficiencies of banks are represented by ui, which is assumed to be ∼ iidN+(0, σ2u).
Both error components are assumed to be independent of each other and the regression parameters.
To estimate firm-level profit efficiency using SFA one must specify a deterministic kernel that
represents the production technology. We employ the widely used Translog functional form with linear
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homogeneity in prices imposed (See Coelli, Rao, O’Donnell, and Battese, 2005, for the derivation):
ln(pii + φ)− lnw1i = β0 +
M∑
m=1
αm ln ymi +
N∑
n=2
βn(lnwni − lnw1i) +
Q∑
q=1
γq ln zqi
+
1
2
M∑
m=1
M∑
j=1
αmj ln ymi ln yji +
N∑
n=1
N∑
k=1
n<k
βnk(lnwni lnwki − 1
2
(lnwni)
2 − 1
2
(lnwki)
2)
+
1
2
Q∑
q=1
Q∑
r=1
γqr ln zqi ln zri +
M∑
m=1
N∑
n=1
δmn ln ymi(lnwni − ξ lnwmi − (1− ξ) lnw1i)
+
M∑
m=1
Q∑
q=1
ηmq ln ymi ln zqi +
Q∑
q=1
N∑
n=1
κqn ln zqi(lnwni − λ lnwqi − (1− λ) lnw1i) + ui + vi, (2)
where
ξ =
 1 if m ≤ N0 else
and
λ =
 1 if q ≤ N0 else.
Here ymi represents the quantity of output m produced by bank i, wni represents the price of
the nth input used by bank i, and zqi is the quantity of the qth fixed input/output used by bank
i. α, β, γ, δ, η and κ are coefficients to be estimated. Bank profit is proxied by the economic value
added (EVA), while φ is a coefficient added to each profit realization to ensure nonnegative values
before taking logs. This parameterization corresponds to the alternative profit efficiency approach of
Berger and Mester (1997). To extract the firm-level inefficiencies from the data, we use the Battese
and Coelli (1988) estimator. We generate estimates of all parameters using maximum likelihood,
obtained through gradient-descent-based maximization of the log likelihood function.
Our sample data to compute bank efficiency via SFA are obtained from the Call Reports provided
by the Chicago Federal Reserve bank, starting with the year 1994 and ending in 2010. Variable
definitions follow Berger, Bonime, Goldberg, and White (2004) and Fiordelisi (2007) and are by and
large standard in the computation of bank efficiency. Specifically, EVA is defined as net operating
profits after tax minus cost of capital, multiplied by capital invested. For inputs, we consider labor
(x1), financial capital (x2) and core deposits (x3). Accordingly, w1 signifies the price of labour, w2
denotes the price of financial capital, and w3 stands for the price of core deposits. Equity (z1) and
fixed assets (z2) are fixed inputs. For outputs, y1 implies consumer loans, y2 denotes business loans,
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y3 stands for real estate loans, and y4 stands for securities. Off-balance-sheet items are denoted by
y5. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of bank inputs and outputs used to compute the efficiency
scores.
[Table 1 about here.]
In Table 2 we report the coefficients for the stochastic frontier over the full sample of banks. The
quotient of the inefficiency to noise component, λ = σuσv = 2.03, shows that banks in our sample vary
greatly in terms of profit efficiency. Additionally, the inefficiency effect is greater than the noise in
the data, which is in line with our expectations, given that banks have previously been shown to
be relatively less profit-efficient (see, for example, Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). The profit
efficiency variation in the sample enables us to effectively identify the impact of managerial ability
from the firm efficiency scores.
[Table 2 about here.]
Having obtained the profit efficiency scores of the banks, the second step is to disentangle managerial
ability from bank-specific effects. To this end, we follow Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) and derive
a measure of managerial ability as the residual from a Tobit regression of bank profit efficiency scores
on a set of bank-specific explanatory variables and year fixed effects. Concretely, the regression takes
the following form:
pi − effSFA,i,t =α+ β1BKSIZEi,t + β2NUMEMPi,t + β3AGEi,t + β4LEV RAGi,t
+ β5FCFi,t +
T∑
t=1
θtdt + i,t.
(3)
Here pi− effSFA,i,t represents profit efficiency as computed by SFA. BKSIZE is the log of gross total
assets, NUMEMP is the log of the number of full time equivalent employees (in thousands), AGE is
the log of the age of the bank (in years), LEV RAG represents leverage, FCF is an indicator variable
that takes the value one when cash flow for the year is positive and zero otherwise, and dt represents
the year dummies. Table 3 reports the results.
[Table 3 about here.]
We find that banks that are more profit-efficient are larger in terms of assets (BKSIZE), more
highly leveraged (LEV RAG), and generate greater free cash flow (FCF ). They also tend to have
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fewer employees (NUMEMP ) and be younger banks (AGE). The magnitude and the signs of these
coefficients are as expected. Thus, for example, one would expect larger and more highly leveraged
institutions with fewer employees to be more profitable. From the above regression, we compute the
residual between actual and predicted profit efficiency and, similarly to Demerjian, Lev, and McVay
(2012), use this variable as our measure of managerial ability (MA). MA captures all effects that
can be attributed to the managers and not the bank. In the following section, we carry out a number
of tests in order to ensure that our MA measure indeed captures the ability of bank management.
3.2. Validating the Managerial Ability Measure
Once the managerial ability measure has been obtained, we investigate its plausibility and test whether
it is value- and performance-relevant. We first investigate the correlations between this measure and
generic performance indicators. We use the return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) and
the shareholder value ratio (SHV R), which, in the spirit of Cipollini and Fiordelisi (2012), is defined
as the quotient between economic value added and gross total assets. These provide first evidence on
the value relevance of the managerial ability measure. This analysis also considers how managerial
ability is related to the Z-Score (ZIND)3, the three-year moving standard deviation of return on
assets (SDROA), the ratio of risk-weighted assets over total assets (CREDRSK), the quantity of
liquid assets divided by gross total assets (LAGTA) and tier 1 ratio (T1R). These variables capture
the association between managerial ability and risk. Results are reported in Table 4.
[Table 4 about here.]
Table 4 shows that managerial ability (MA) displays significantly positive correlations with the
performance (ROA, ROE) and value creation characteristics (SHV R). In terms of risk, it is found
that more ably managed banks bear higher levels of risk-weighted assets (CREDRSK) and lower
levels of tier 1 ratio (T1R) and liquid assets (LAGTA), while there is no statistical relation to bank
fragility (ZIND). Thus the bulk of this evidence points towards more ably managed banks taking
more risk. This may indicate that these banks bear higher levels of riskiness since their managers
have the necessary skills and talent to better understand the business environment and be effective
in managing more risky business portfolios with lower levels of capital cushions without affecting the
fragility of their banks. Thus the main conclusion of this analysis points towards more ably managed
banks being both more profitable and value creating, but also more risky.
3ZIND is computed as return on assets plus capital to asset ratio, divided by the (previous three years’) standard
deviation of return on assets.
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As an additional analysis of MA for banks, we test its predictive power for bank performance.
The current literature on managerial ability has so far been mainly concentrated on showing the
importance ofMA for industrial firm performance. Initial evidence that Demerjian, Lev, and McVay’s
(2012) managerial ability measure is also appropriate for banks is provided by Cantrell (2013), who
documents that the MA measure is indicative of superior reporting quality. However, evidence that
the MA measure is important for explaining bank performance is as yet incomplete. Therefore, as
additional analysis, we regress ROA and ROE on the first order lag of MA. If MA is a useful
predictor of bank performance, one would expect a positive relation with return on assets and return
on equity. The specification can be formalized as follows:
PMj,i,t = α+ βMAi,t−1 + ξ′zi,t +
T∑
t=1
θtdt + υi + i,t, (4)
where PMj signifies performance measure jth for j ∈ {ROA,ROE}. MA denotes the managerial
ability measure, dt are year dummies, and z is a vector containing control variables. The control
variables include the log of gross total assets (BKSIZE) to capture differences in profitability due
to bank size such as economies of scale, and cost efficiency parameterized by SFA (CE) to capture
differences in technology and allocation which may drive profitability. Furthermore, we control for
organizational characteristics such as holding company status, and recent mergers and acquisitions.
This is accomplished by way of dummy variables that take the value one if a bank is part of a
multi-bank holding company (MBHC) or one-bank holding company (OBHC). Additional indica-
tor variables control for the influence of mergers and acquisitions activity on bank efficiency (for a
discussion of mergers and efficiency see, for example, Ahmad, Ariff, and Skully, 2007). Specifically,
MRG is set to one in the case of a merger and zero otherwise, and ACQ to one in the case that the
bank was acquired during the last three years and zero otherwise. It is further advantageous to control
for local market characteristics by including the bank-level Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (BKHHI),
the market share of medium and large banks in the area (BKMSML), the log bank-level popula-
tion (BKPOP ), and population density (BKPDNS), as well as the percent income growth rates
(BKICHG).4 Using these variables, we capture the differences between banks that arise from their
organizational form or location. Raw demographic data are obtained from the Bureau of Economic
4We define local markets according to Metropolitan Statistical areas (MSAs) or counties that are not MSAs. We
then use data on the deposits held by each bank in each of these markets to calculate the relative significance
of the market for the bank. Using these quotients as weights, we compute the weighted bank-level local market
characteristic variables for each bank.
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Analysis (www.bea.gov), while data on bank deposits are obtained from the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (www.fdic.gov). Because the regression specifications are in keeping with Berger
and Bouwman (2009), the basic setup uses three-year moving averages of the regressors. Hence the
final dataset spans the years 1994-2010 and contains 100,976 bank-year observations. In addition,
in all regression specifications models we use one period lagged of the managerial ability measure,
namely MAt−1.
[Table 5 about here.]
The results of these regressions are reported in Table 5. The coefficients show that for both ROA
and ROE, one year lagged managerial ability has a strongly significant and positive impact. Thus
we document that the MA measure can capture bank profitability. The controls show that size
is negatively associated with profitability as is cost efficiency. Banks that operate in more aﬄuent
(BKICHG), less densely populated (BKPOP, BKPDNS) markets, with a greater presence of
medium and large banks (BKMSML) tend to be more profitable. Bank holding companies are
more profitable than non-bank holding companies (MBHC, OBHC). Further, recent mergers and
acquisitions impair profitability (MRG, ACQ). This may be due to integration costs incurred before
the benefits of economies of scale and scope due to mergers or acquisitions can be fully realized.
Overall, the control variables provide plausible information; but more importantly, the regressions
confirm the expected positive relation between managerial ability and profitability and thus qualify
the MA measure as a valid measure that should capture the impact of managerial ability on banks’
outcomes.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Managerial Ability, Bank Liquidity Creation and Risk-Taking
In this section, we analyze the influence that managerial ability exerts on liquidity creation and bank
risk characteristics. Liquidity creation is addressed first. Subsequently, this section also investigates
bank risk-taking along a number of dimensions.
We study liquidity creation using bank-level data that is stratified by bank size. It is well known
(see, for example, Feng and Serletis, 2009) that the US banking industry is composed of a large number
of small banks, and substantially smaller numbers of medium and very large banks. Accordingly, in
line with Berger and Bouwman (2009) we use cutoffs at GTA $1 billion and GTA $3 billion USD to
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separate small, medium and large banks respectively, and we run the analysis for each subsample
of the population separately as well as for the full sample of banks. Table 6 reports summary
statistics for the key bank characteristic variables used in the analysis. We observe that the MA
measure decreases with bank size within the sample, with small banks showing the greatest average
managerial ability among the three subsamples. Since MA is constructed as a residual, it is natural
to observe that for the full sample managerial ability is close to zero on average. Consistent with
findings in Berger and Bouwman (2009), liquidity creation per dollar of assets (CATFAT ) is much
greater in large banks. Large banks also exhibit lower levels of tier 1 capital (T1R) and also have
greater quantities of risk-weighted assets (CREDRSK) on their books. They usually are more risky
in terms of distance to default (ZIND) as well, while the variation of return on assets (SDROA)
also tends to be greater. Medium and large banks tend to be more cost-efficient (CE) than small
banks and they operate in more populous (BKPOP ), aﬄuent (BKMSML) and less concentrated
markets (BKHHI). Medium banks also exhibit the highest merger and acquisition activity (MRG)
in the sample as well as the lowest level of liquid assets (LAGTA). Overall, the characteristics of the
sample are in line with those reported in previous studies such as Berger and Bouwman (2009).
[Table 6 about here.]
Next, this section investigates bank liquidity creation in more detail in order to test the Ability-
Liquidity hypothesis (H1). The model specification uses bank and year fixed effects and we report
standard errors clustered by bank. Specifically,
CATFATi,t
GTAi,t
= α+ β1MAi,t−1 + ξ′zi,t +
T∑
t=1
θtdt + υi + i,t, (5)
where CATFAT is the liquidity creation measure as defined by Berger and Bouwman (2009) and
GTA represents gross total assets. The main variable of interest, MA, is lagged by one period so
as to avoid possible endogeneity issues and z is a vector of contemporaneous bank characteristic
variables that are used as regressors. Following Berger and Bouwman (2009), as proxies for risk, we
use the three-year moving averages of the sum of risk-weighted assets scaled by gross total assets
(CREDRSK), the moving standard deviation of the ROA (SDROA) and the Z-Score (ZIND).5
5Since these variables all measure risk, the last two are orthogonalized by regressing ZIND and SDROA on each
other, CREDRSK and all other explanatory variables, and using the resulting errors as the eventual independent
variable. Orthogonalizing these measures against one another and the remaining covariates ensures that the impact
of collinearity is minimized and that the orthogonalized variables capture only the dimension not covered by the
other variables. Moreover, this procedure ensures comparability of the present results with those provided in Berger
and Bouwman (2009), who introduce this regression specification.
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We further include the log of gross total assets to control for bank size (BKSIZE) and equity
over asset ratio (EA) to account for bank capitalization.6 Additionally, the regression specification
controls for organizational characteristics and local market characteristics as defined previously. If
the Ability-Liquidity hypothesis holds, one would expect a positive association between the lagged
managerial ability and liquidity creation. Table 7 reports the results of the regression analysis, where
each subsample of the bank population is treated in a separate column.
[Table 7 about here.]
The main result relates to the significance of MAt−1. Importantly, we find that managerial ability
is significantly positively associated with liquidity creation for small and medium banks as well as the
overall population. This is as initially theorized and lends credence to the Ability-Liquidity hypothesis.
In addition, the findings on the control variables are very similar to those reported in the literature.
Thus, in keeping with Berger and Bouwman (2009), results show that ZIND and SDROA have
a negative effect on liquidity creation, while banks with higher CREDRSK create more liquidity.
We observe that the effect of these risk proxies on liquidity creation is more significant in the case
of smaller banks. Similarly, EA is significant and negatively related to liquidity creation mainly for
small banks, reflecting the key role of capital for liquidity creation. Further, we observe that being a
bank holding company (MBHC,OBHC) is beneficial for liquidity creation among small banks. This
is likely due to better access to resources channeled through the holding company. Additionally, bank
merger activity (MRG) has a significant and positive association for liquidity creation and the result
holds across all bank sizes. In term of bank market demographics, the results show that small banks
that are active in more concentrated (BKHHI), more populous (BKPOP ) and aﬄuent markets
(BKICHG) create more liquidity. The latter finding is highly significant also for medium and large
banks in our sample.
Next, we investigate whether ability of managers has an influence on bank risk-taking behavior. If
so, this would be an important feature of banks which has heretofore not been examined. Specifically,
the Ability-Risk hypothesis (H2) posits that more able managers will take more risk due to their
greater confidence in their ability to manage such risk. Hence the following analysis proceeds by
regressing proxies for bank risk-taking on the lagged managerial ability measure, while controlling for
other bank characteristics. As measures of bank risk, we use the tier 1 ratio (T1R), the ratio of liquid
6While bank capitalization is likely to be an important determinant of liquidity creation, endogeneity concerns
may arise (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). Hence we rerun our regressions without EA and find the results to be
qualitatively unchanged. We orthogonalize EA against SDROA, CREDRSK and ZIND and the other controls,
and use only the residual as a regressor, since EA may be capturing risk. Again our results hold.
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assets to total assets (LAGTA) and Z-Score (ZIND)7. Our choice of bank risk proxies is motivated
by their ability to capture three important dimensions of bank operations. First, the tier 1 ratio is
a key regulatory measure of capitalization, which banks are likely to target in their decision-making
more strongly than, for example, the equity over asset ratio. Second, the quantity of liquid assets
captures the liquidity of a bank, which is a key dimension of its resilience to shocks. This quantity is
defined by using the CAT classification of Berger and Bouwman (2009) and considering only liquid
assets. Finally, Z-Score is a well known measure of a bank’s distance to default that captures bank
fragility.
If the Ability-Risk hypothesis holds, we expect a negative association between managerial ability
and the three risk measures, T1R, LAGTA and ZIND. The regressions take the form in Equation
(6):
KRIk,i,t = α+ β1MAi,t−1 + ξ′zi,t +
T∑
t=1
θtdt + υi + i,t, (6)
where KRIk represents the key risk indicator, where k indexes into {T1R,LAGTA,ZIND}. All
other regressors are as previously defined. Table 9 reports the results.
The key variable of interest is the one year lagged managerial ability measure (MAt−1). The results
in Panel A indicate that more able managers prefer to hold greater levels of tier 1 capital in small
banks but lower for medium banks. Panel B shows that managers of small and medium banks prefer
to hold lower quantities of liquid assets. Finally, Panel C shows that medium to large banks with
more able managers tend to face greater fragility as they exhibit smaller distance to default. Overall,
we find that for the case of medium and large banks, managerial ability contributes significantly to
the riskiness of the bank. Thus, these findings support the Ability-Risk hypothesis that more able
managers take greater risk and this effect can be clearly observed among larger banks. For small
banks, however, this relation is reversed. This is consistent with the results found for the tier 1 ratio
above. This finding is suggestive of differences in incentives and constraints that managers from small
and other banks face. Thus it is conceivable that managers of larger institutions that tend to be
rewarded with a significant compensation (for example, in the form of stock options) will be more
prepared to take greater risk than managers of smaller institutions, who are more likely to focus on the
bank’s survival. Additionally, due to limited access to finance, small banks will opt for larger capital
buffers and take on less risk than large banks that have more easy access to funding from capital
7Since we utilize three observations of ROA to compute the standard deviation of ROA, we use the third lag of all
other regressors in the regressions that have ZIND as the dependent variable and omit ZIND from the right-hand-
side.
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markets (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). In terms of the other covariates, we find that greater holdings
of risk-weighted assets per unit assets (CREDRSK) tend to be negatively associated with the tier 1
capital levels, liquid assets, and distance to default. Additionally, equity capital ratio is consistently
positive and significant across the various risk measures. This indicates that bank capitalization, an
important determinant of liquidity creation, is positively related to risk-taking.
[Table 8 about here.]
Overall, this section provides strong support for the hypotheses that more able bank managers
generally contribute positively to liquidity creation in the economy. Furthermore, as the split sample
analysis shows, this finding is not driven merely by larger banks that may pay more and thus attract
greater managerial talent. Managerial ability matters for small banks’ liquidity creation as well. In
addition, results suggest that more able bank managers tend to pursue more risky strategies in terms
of liquidity, loan portfolio risk and distance to default. This holds particularly for the case of medium
and large banks. The next section addresses the question how managerial ability influences liquidity
creation during crisis times.
4.2. Effects of Managerial Ability on Liquidity Creation and Risk-Taking During the
Financial Crisis
This section investigates the Ability-Liquidity Expansion (H3a) or Contraction hypotheses (H3b),
and the Ability-Risk Expansion (H4a) or Contraction hypotheses (H4b), where we test whether bank
managerial ability influences the liquidity creation and risk-taking behavior after the onset of the
financial crisis in 2007. In order to isolate the ability of bank managers from the effect of the financial
crisis, we measure managerial ability one year prior to the start of the financial crisis, specifically at
the end of fiscal year 2006 (MA06). Our model specification is as follows:
CATFATi,t
GTAi,t
= α+ β1δc + β2MAi,06 × δc + ξ′zi,t + υi + i,t, (7)
where we regress the liquidity creation measure for the period 2007-2010 on an indicator variable,
δc, set to one for years belonging to the financial crisis period, and the interaction of δc with the
bank’s pre-crisis managerial ability measure, MA06, while controlling for bank and time fixed effects
and bank characteristics as previously. For the analysis, we consider the period of financial crisis as
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encompassing the years 2007-2009.8 The model specification takes managerial ability to be predeter-
mined with respect to the financial crisis period, since it is estimated in 2006, which is a period that
resides outside the period spanned by the data used in the above regression model; in this respect,
the analysis also mitigates any endogeneity concerns that could arise from expectations regarding the
anticipation of the crisis.9 Therefore, the model specification is suitable to reveal the true impact of
managerial ability on liquidity creation, which can also be conceived as an acid test of whether or not
managerial ability affects bank liquidity creation.
We expect the coefficients on the crisis indicator variable (δc) to be negative and significant due
to the disruptive effects of the financial crisis on bank intermediation. The coefficient estimates for
the interaction of MA06 with δc will allow us to disentangle hypothesis H3a from H3b. Specifically,
the regression specification asks the question whether more able managers expand intermediation
during the crisis, consistent with Berger and Bouwman (2013) and the Ability-Liquidity Expansion
hypothesis, or whether anticipation of risk led more able managers to reduce it, consistent with
Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011) and the Ability-Liquidity Contraction hypothesis. The results of this
analysis are reported in Table 9.
[Table 9 about here.]
As expected, the results show that the crisis has a strongly significant negative impact on liquidity
creation (δc), indicating that banks reduced liquidity creation during the crisis. Furthermore, the main
variable of interest, the interaction of pre-crisis managerial ability with the crisis indicator variable,
MA06 × δc, shows that more able managers reduced the liquidity creation of their banks during the
crisis period more significantly, which is consistent with the Ability-Liquidity Contraction hypothesis.
This result holds in the overall pooled sample and its statistical significance is mostly driven by small
banks.
Next, we investigate the risk-taking behavior during the financial crisis period as postulated by the
Ability-Risk Expansion hypothesis or Ability-Risk Contraction hypothesis. The preceding analyses
8Our main results continue to hold for alternative definitions of the crisis period, where we let the crisis periods range
from 2007-2008 or 2008-2009 (results available on request).
9One could argue that owners, anticipating a crisis, may have tried to hire more able managers at the last minute.
However, the market for managerial talent is limited and therefore, even if such behavior were to have obtained,
it could only have affected a very small fraction of the sample of banks. This is especially the case because the
majority of the sample consists of small banks where the mobility of managers in terms of their workplace as well as
their visibility to competitors is much smaller than, for example, in listed banks, where news coverage and disclosure
make for much more visible managers. More importantly, given the time needed to decide to replace, to find and
to actually recruit a top management team, it seems extremely unlikely that owners will have been able to replace
their banks’ management in anticipation of an impending crisis event.
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have shown that, during normal times, more able managers tend to prefer running more risky banks
in terms of capitalization (T1R), liquidity (LAGTA) and distance to default (ZIND). If more
able managers have indeed taken more controlled risks in normal times, then they should be more
successful in de-leveraging during the fincancial crisis period if it is optimal to do so. Therefore,
if the Ability-Risk Contraction hypothesis holds, we would therefore expect positive signs on T1R,
LAGTA and ZIND. Alternatively, if the Ability-Risk Expansion hypothesis holds, then we would
expect negative signs on T1R, LAGTA and ZIND, implying that more able managers increased their
banks’ riskiness; however, due to the fact that data have supported the Ability-Liquidity Contraction
hypothesis during the financial crisis, we would expect to observe a predominance of the Ability-Risk
Contraction hypothesis. The following analysis considers the results during crisis times by running
the regression specification:
KRIk,i,t = α+ β1δc + β2MAi,06 × δc + ξ′zi,t + υi + i,t, (8)
where again KRIk represents the key risk indicator, with k ∈ {T1R,LAGTA,ZIND}. All other
regressors are as previously defined. Table 10 reports the results.
[Table 10 about here.]
It is very interesting to observe that the coefficients on the crisis indicator variable, δc, exhibit in
general plausible signs. For instance, one would expect that, in an environment where asset values
drop precipitously, losses accumulate and equity is hard to raise, therefore tier 1 capital (T1R) will
decline (Panel A). One would also expect that banks will attempt to increase their holdings of liquid
assets (LAGTA) as a reaction to the onset of the financial crisis (Panel B). Finally, it is natural that
the crisis shock will induce banks to come closer to default (ZIND)(Panel C).
Regarding the hypotheses under scrutiny, the results indicate that more able managers reduce risk
as a reaction to the crisis. Thus Panels A and B show that pre-crisis managerial ability increases both
the tier 1 ratio (T1R) and liquid assets (LAGTA). This holds significantly for small banks and in
the overall sample and, for LAGTA, also for large banks. In Panel C we repeat the regression above
with the risk measure based on ZIND as the dependent variable and with regressors lagged by three
years to avoid overlapping sample periods, as previously. Again the result confirms our main findings.
Specifically, we observe that, while the crisis plausibly increases banks’ fragility since δc is large and
significantly negative, higher pre-crisis managerial ability dampens a bank’s fragility significantly.
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Hence this result again confirms that more able managers are better at de-leveraging during the crisis.
To test the robustness of our findings, we repeat this analysis without taking the lag of the independent
variables and find results qualitatively unchanged. Overall, there is overwhelming evidence to support
the interpretation that managerial ability facilitated banks’ reactions to the financial crisis in terms
of risk reduction, and therefore provides support for the Ability-Risk Contraction hypothesis.
In sum, the analyses show, first, that banks that were more ably managed before the crisis reduce
their liquidity creation activity more strongly than other banks, which supports the Ability-Liquidity
Contraction hypothesis. Second, more ably managed banks find it easier to react to the crisis by
increasing their capitalization and liquidity holdings. This supports the view expressed in the Ability-
Risk Contraction hypothesis that more able managers are better able to react to exogenous shocks
by de-leveraging. Together these findings strongly suggest that the resilience of banks to exogenous
shocks depends, at least in part, on the ability of their managers.
5. Robustness Checks
In this section, we discuss a number of robustness tests carried out. First, we investigate the sensitivity
of the results to the choice of liquidity creation measure. Therefore we replicate the main analysis using
both Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) CATNONFAT measure as well as the liquidity transformation
gap of Deep and Schaefer (2004). While it has been noted that this latter variable is somewhat more
crude than that of Berger and Bouwman (2009), it does provide a useful check on the robustness of
the main results. Using these measures of liquidity creation we find that the results for the whole
sample period as well as the results for the financial crisis hold in qualitative terms.
Second, a source of endogeneity may arise in the regression analysis due to the presence of bank
size, risk-weighted assets, volatility of ROA and the Z-Score as regressors, as these components can
influence liquidity creation, and also managerial decision-making. Therefore we rerun all the analyses
omitting EA, BKSIZE, CREDRSK, SDROA and ZIND. Additionally, to purge the concerns
of endogeneity, Berger and Bouwman (2009) propose the identification strategy of using three-year
lagged moving average values of the independent variables, instead of using the three-year moving
averages. Hence we also replicate our results with this identification strategy.
Third, we test for the validity of our findings using alternative constructions of the managerial ability
measure. While Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) demonstrate the validity of the managerial ability
measure, there are other parameterizations possible, with each having their own specific strengths
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and weaknesses. Thus efficiency scores can be obtained from various methodologies such as DEA
or SFA. While DEA makes the assumption that the data is observed without noise, SFA requires
the assumption of a known functional form for the profit function as well as the distributions of
error terms. In addition, instead of profit maximization, revenue generation given fixed resources, as
postulated by Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012), might be the primary goal of management. Hence
we consider the different outcomes from the analysis when the managerial ability measure (MA) is
quantified using: (i) revenue efficiency obtained from SFA, (ii) revenue efficiency obtained from DEA,
and (iii) profit efficiency obtained from DEA. Furthermore, for each of these efficiency scores, the
first stage Tobit regressions that eventually yieldMA as the residual can plausibly be conducted with
various sets of regressors. We investigate whether this choice has any effect on the results. Specifically,
we analyze whether including the bank holding company type as a regressor along with the original
control variables alters the results. This approach is chosen since this characteristic is both likely
to influence bank performance (bank holding company members typically have access to the BHC’s
resources in crisis times) and be beyond the individual manager’s immediate control. In addition,
one could argue that out of the original regressors inspired by Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012)
and Cantrell (2013), BKSIZE, NUMEMP and LEV RAG have the potential to be endogenous to
bank revenue or profit efficiency. Therefore we introduce a third set of regressors that excludes these
potentially endogenous variables, while instead including the bank demographic controls as defined in
the main analysis. Finally, the Tobit regressions can be conducted over a pooled sample of banks, as
in the main analysis, or for each year of bank data separately. The latter approach has the advantage
that any potential confounding look-ahead effects that emanate from including future data in the
regression can be avoided. We also check for this influence. In sum, we replicate the analysis for 18
different specifications of managerial ability and find very robust results.
Fourth, one potential concern with our analysis could be that our measure of managerial ability is
contaminated by risk and hence is trivially related to bank risk-taking and liquidity creation. One
way of addressing this concern is to include additional risk variables in the Tobit regressions which
yield MA as the residual. This should purge the MA measure of the impact of risk. Clearly, bank
risk-taking will be heavily influenced by management and hence it is not clear that purging risk
characteristics from efficiency scores is consistent with the paradigm of Demerjian, Lev, and McVay
(2012). On the other hand, the concern that our MA results might be driven by risk is valid and
hence we investigate the robustness of our results by including CREDRSK, SDROA and ZIND
in our initial MA regressions. This risk-adjusted measure of managerial ability yields very similar
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results to the main analysis. During crisis times, more able managers reduce their liquidity creation
more and also significantly reduce risk. Thus, overall results are very similar to those found in the
main analysis, which confirms that our findings are not merely driven by risk.
Fifth and finally, the base case analysis uses the entire period (1996-2010) to identify the influence
that managerial ability has on liquidity creation and the other bank characteristics in normal times.
As this period includes the financial crisis itself, results could be driven by these effects. Therefore, (i)
we rerun the base case regressions for the 1996-2006 subsample, (ii) we investigate whether restricting
the crisis period to 2008-2009 or 2007-2008 instead of 2007-2009 influences the results, and (iii) we
analyze the results that we obtain for a placebo crisis between 2003 and 2004. Our findings are not
sensitive to particular sample periods and the observed effects remain qualitatively very similar.
6. Conclusion
We investigate the impact of managerial ability on liquidity creation and risk-taking. While liquidity
creation is a primary and crucial function of banking organizations, their risk-taking behavior is
also important to regulators. We find that more able managers create more liquidity per dollar of
assets and more ably managed banks also take on more risk. Next, we examine whether managerial
ability has a role to play during financial crisis periods in this context of liquidity creation and risk-
taking behavior. The impact of the crisis, as mediated by managerial ability, on liquidity creation
is an empirical question, since the theoretical literature suggests that banks should decrease their
liquidity creation, while some empirical findings contest this assertion. Our test results indicate that
the former case holds true: more ably managed banks reduce liquidity creation during the financial
crisis. Finally, the paper analyzes the significance of managerial ability for bank risk-taking during
the financial crisis. We find that more able managers are better at de-leveraging their bank during
the crisis. Our findings are found to be robust to a large number of checks and imply that regulators
may do well in favoring better-managed banks in normal times in order to maximize the creation of
liquidity in the economy. In crisis times, on the other hand, more ably managed banks may require
additional incentives to lend.
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A. Appendix A
In this appendix, we report the definitions of the main variables used in the analysis throughout this
paper.
[Table 11 about here.]
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Bank Inputs and Outputs
This table reports summary statistics for the main variables used to compute our efficiency scores. Specifically,
x1 = labor, x2 = financial capital, x3 = core deposits y1 = consumer loans, y2 = business loans, y3 = real
estate loans, y4 = securities, y5 = off-balance-sheet items, w1 = price of labor, w2 = price of financial capital,
w3 = price of core deposits, z1 is equity and z2 stands for fixed assets; both z1 and z2 are treated as fixed.
Values for input and output quantities are in millions of 2005 US dollars, where adjustment to this basis period
was achieved using the GDP implied deflator.
Variable Mean Standard
devia-
tion
Minimum Maximum Definition
x1 197.55 2,732.24 2 213,967.00 Number of employed full-time equivalent
by the bank
x2 354.78 9,387.34 0.07 969,472.10 Financial capital is defined as the sum of
purchased funds
x3 492.22 6,567.28 0.61 636,319.30 Savings deposits, transactions accounts,
time deposits (< USD 100,000)
y1 60.55 1,005.37 0 84,001.8 Credit card and similar as well as install-
ment loans to individuals originated in do-
mestic offices
y2 184.92 4,040.78 0 401,295.80 Agricultural, commercial and industrial
loans and loans to depository institutions
y3 266.61 3,641.24 0 370,750.80 Loans secured by real estate
y4 337.55 7,926.45 0.48 998,783.20 Financial assets that are not loans
y5 101.59 2,797.38 0 379,477.90 Off-balance-sheet items such as deriva-
tives, letters of credit, and commitments
w1 53.16 11.99 5.22 286.31 Price of labor, including salary and bene-
fits per FTE
w2 0.07 0.02 0.007 0.49 Expense of purchased funds divided by
price of purchased funds
w3 0.04 0.01 0.003 0.26 Expense of core deposits divided by price
of core deposits
z1 76.67 1,319.38 0.53 117,810.60 Total equity capital
z2 10.23 120.53 0 7,997.87 Premises and other fixed assets
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Table 2: Estimates of SFA-based profit efficiency.
This table reports estimates of alternative profit efficiency. Estimates follow the specification in Equation (2).
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels
respectively.
α1 0.243∗∗∗ β1 -2.859∗∗∗ δ53 0.502∗∗
(11.07) (-51.78) (2.51)
α2 0.0322 β2 2.875∗∗∗ η11 0.0264
(0.92) (37.90) (1.08)
α3 0.620∗∗∗ β3 1.029∗∗∗ η12 -0.0393
(19.21) (22.20) (-0.91)
α4 0.215∗∗∗ β12 15.62∗∗∗ η21 0.313∗∗∗
(4.77) (34.69) (7.31)
α5 -0.0332 β13 -12.75∗∗∗ η22 0.284∗∗∗
(-0.99) (-34.74) (4.20)
α11 0.124∗∗∗ β23 8.096∗∗∗ η31 0.323∗∗∗
(4.62) (16.97) (9.07)
α12 -0.161∗∗∗ γ1 -0.257∗∗∗ η32 -0.0944
(-6.40) (-10.02) (-1.59)
α13 -0.0807∗∗∗ γ2 0.331∗∗∗ η41 0.166∗∗∗
(-3.53) (5.38) (3.27)
α14 0.0539 γ11 -0.583∗∗∗ η42 -0.340∗∗∗
(1.59) (-11.20) (-3.04)
α15 0.0737∗∗∗ γ12 -0.158∗∗ η51 -0.165∗∗∗
(3.23) (-2.37) (-4.64)
α22 -0.138∗∗ γ22 0.427∗∗∗ η52 -0.0745
(-2.12) (2.69) (-1.20)
α23 -0.231∗∗∗ δ12 -0.359∗∗ κ12 3.040∗∗∗
(-6.16) (-2.35) (15.14)
α24 -0.185∗∗∗ δ13 0.531∗∗∗ κ13 -1.495∗∗∗
(-3.12) (4.01) (-8.73)
α25 0.202∗∗∗ δ23 0.0403 κ23 1.375∗∗∗
(5.38) (0.18) (3.87)
α33 0.00622 δ32 -0.0702 Constant 8.519∗∗∗
(0.14) (-0.38) (197.93)
α34 -0.0138 δ42 -0.378 σu 1.195
(-0.29) (-1.34) σv 0.588
α35 0.118∗∗∗ δ43 -1.545∗∗∗
(3.96) (-6.03)
α44 0.164 δ52 -0.548∗∗
(1.57) (-2.28)
α45 0.0646
(1.22)
α55 -0.212∗∗∗
(-5.02)
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Table 3:
Validation of Managerial Ability Measure.
Coefficients from pooled Tobit regressions with time
fixed effects. The dependent variable is the alterna-
tive profit efficiency score obtained from stochastic
frontier analysis. BKSIZE stands for the natural
log of gross total assets, NUMEMP is the natural
log of the number of thousand full-time equivalent
employees, AGE is the log of bank age, LEV RAG
is the leverage of the bank, while FCF is a dummy
variable set to one if the bank has free cash flow.
Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and
0.01 (***) levels respectively. Monetary values are in
2005 US Dollars.
BKSIZE 0.0907∗∗∗
(29.58)
NUMEMP -0.129∗∗∗
(-39.97)
AGE -0.00261∗∗∗
(-4.49)
LEV RAG 0.0153∗∗∗
(55.06)
FCF 0.0182∗∗∗
(12.98)
Constant 0.00567
(0.22)
Time FE Yes
N 100976
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Table 4:
Correlations of Managerial Ability with Bank Performance Mea-
sures.
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients of managerial abil-
ity and bank performance characteristics. ROA (ROE) stands for
return on assets (equity). Shareholder value ratio, SHV R, is the quo-
tient between economic value added and gross total assets. ZIND
stands for the Z-Score measure of distance to default where the vari-
ance of the return on assets has been computed for each bank individ-
ually using the last three observations. CREDRSK is the quantity of
risk weighted assets over total assets. T1R stands for the tier 1 ratio.
LAGTA stands for liquid assets scaled by total assets. MA represents
one-year lagged managerial ability measure as obtained following the
methodology of Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) using SFA-based
alternative profit efficiency. Stars (***) report significance at the 0.01
level.
MA
ROA 0.0442∗∗∗
ROE 0.0725∗∗∗
SHV R 0.0811∗∗∗
ZIND 0.00211
CREDRSK 0.2180∗∗∗
T1R -0.1260∗∗∗
LAGTA -0.3120∗∗∗
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Table 5:
Bank Performance and Managerial Ability.
This table reports results from fixed effects regressions of
return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) on
lagged managerial ability (MAt−1) and and lagged (3-year
moving averages of) bank characteristic control variables,
with bank and time fixed effects and standard errors clus-
tered by bank. The definitions of all the variables are de-
tailed in Appendix A. All variables are winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentile to reduce the influence of outliers.
Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01
(***) levels respectively. T-statistics are reported in paren-
theses.
ROA ROE
MAt−1 0.000249∗∗∗ 0.00401∗∗∗
(4.53) (5.86)
BKSIZE -0.000834∗∗∗ -0.0196∗∗∗
(-3.38) (-6.91)
CE -0.000250∗∗∗ -0.00571∗∗∗
(-3.41) (-6.79)
BKHHI 0.000142 0.00161
(1.13) (1.09)
BKMSML 0.000949∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗
(7.05) (7.25)
BKPOP -0.00194∗∗∗ -0.0214∗∗∗
(-5.76) (-5.44)
BKPDNS -0.000963∗∗∗ -0.0124∗∗∗
(-3.61) (-3.79)
BKICHG 0.000897∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗
(17.97) (19.33)
MBHC 0.000131 0.00495∗∗∗
(1.05) (3.48)
OBHC 0.000283∗∗ 0.00665∗∗∗
(2.48) (4.98)
MRG -0.0000318∗∗ -0.000419
(-2.02) (-1.59)
ACQ -0.0000485 -0.000834∗∗
(-1.46) (-2.13)
Constant 0.00672∗∗∗ 0.0645∗∗∗
(44.87) (35.98)
Adj. R2 0.153 0.154
N 84356 84356
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Table 7: Bank Liquidity Creation and Managerial Ability.
This table reports regression results of Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) CATFAT measure of liquidity creation
scaled by total assets on lagged managerial ability (MAt−1) and lagged (3-year moving averages of) bank
characteristic control variables, with bank and time fixed effects and standard errors clustered by bank. The
definitions of all the variables are detailed in Appendix A. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentile to reduce the influence of outliers. Monetary values are in 2005 US Dollars. Stars report significance
at the 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***) levels respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Small Medium Large All
MAt−1 0.0387∗∗∗ 0.0366∗∗∗ -0.0131 0.0340∗∗∗
(7.87) (3.00) (-0.75) (7.44)
CREDRSK 0.616∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗
(55.92) (14.11) (10.84) (58.21)
ZIND -0.000854∗∗ -0.00191 0.00160 -0.000729∗∗
(-2.54) (-1.42) (0.64) (-2.26)
SDROA -0.00814∗∗∗ -0.0328∗∗∗ -0.0311∗∗ -0.00994∗∗∗
(-3.62) (-4.30) (-2.02) (-4.64)
EA -0.419∗∗∗ -0.0715 0.156 -0.374∗∗∗
(-13.15) (-0.51) (0.68) (-12.21)
BKSIZE -0.0137∗∗∗ -0.0164 0.00259 -0.0128∗∗∗
(-5.45) (-1.50) (0.19) (-5.68)
BKHHI 0.0160∗∗ -0.0360 0.00884 0.0134∗
(2.05) (-0.64) (0.05) (1.66)
BKMSML 0.0200∗∗∗ -0.00491 -0.0847 0.0186∗∗∗
(4.51) (-0.19) (-1.48) (4.31)
BKPOP 0.00797∗∗∗ 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.0230 0.00850∗∗∗
(4.84) (2.72) (1.32) (5.35)
BKPDNS 0.000596 -0.0142 -0.0102 -0.00120
(0.17) (-1.05) (-0.26) (-0.35)
BKICHG 0.201∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗ 0.619∗ 0.220∗∗∗
(10.76) (4.62) (1.92) (11.86)
MBHC 0.0185∗∗∗ 0.0131 0.0290 0.0182∗∗∗
(5.11) (0.80) (0.66) (5.29)
OBHC 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0196 0.0379 0.0141∗∗∗
(4.74) (1.26) (0.88) (5.07)
MRG 0.0376∗∗∗ 0.0740∗∗∗ 0.0254∗ 0.0652∗∗∗
(4.71) (4.58) (1.86) (8.07)
ACQ 0.000608 0.00410 -0.00800 0.000361
(0.39) (0.55) (-0.63) (0.24)
Constant -0.0875∗∗∗ -0.145 -0.355 -0.0976∗∗∗
(-2.66) (-0.74) (-1.28) (-3.19)
Bank FE yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.478 0.461 0.376 0.475
N 79152 3341 1863 84356
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Table 9: Impact of Managerial Ability on Bank Liquidity Creation During the Financial Crisis.
This table reports regression results of Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) CATFAT measure of liquidity creation
scaled by total assets on an indicator variable, δc, set to one for years belonging to the financial crisis period,
the interaction of δc with the bank’s pre-crisis managerial ability measure, MA06, parameterized by SFA profit
efficiency as measured at the end of 2006, and lagged (3-year moving averages of) bank characteristic control
variables, with bank and time fixed effects and standard errors clustered by bank. The definitions of all the
variables are detailed in Appendix A. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to reduce the
influence of outliers. Monetary values are in 2005 US Dollars. Stars report significance at the 0.1 (*), 0.05
(**) and 0.01 (***) levels respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Small Medium Large All
MA06 × δc -0.103∗∗∗ -0.0432 -0.00889 -0.0551∗∗∗
(-6.12) (-1.43) (-0.24) (-4.04)
δc -0.00430∗∗∗ -0.0108∗∗ -0.0160∗∗∗ -0.00649∗∗∗
(-4.99) (-2.51) (-2.63) (-7.82)
CREDRSK 0.769∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗
(29.60) (6.97) (4.12) (30.86)
ZIND 0.00170∗∗∗ 0.00235 0.00602 0.00161∗∗∗
(2.81) (0.86) (1.15) (2.76)
SDROA -0.0234∗∗∗ -0.0372∗∗∗ -0.0288∗ -0.0242∗∗∗
(-6.08) (-3.89) (-1.71) (-6.88)
EA 0.0197 -0.135 0.128 0.0430
(0.30) (-0.53) (0.29) (0.70)
BKSIZE -0.0641∗∗∗ -0.0250 -0.0149 -0.0532∗∗∗
(-9.09) (-1.04) (-0.93) (-8.66)
BKHHI -0.000732 -0.132∗∗ -0.412∗∗∗ -0.0183
(-0.06) (-2.34) (-3.88) (-1.48)
BKMSML 0.0359∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.0844 0.0361∗∗∗
(5.36) (2.60) (0.72) (5.56)
BKPOP 0.00395 0.00685 -0.0231 0.00282
(1.34) (0.62) (-0.64) (1.00)
BKPDNS -0.0213∗∗∗ -0.0490∗ -0.00395 -0.0249∗∗∗
(-3.36) (-1.93) (-0.07) (-4.03)
BKICHG 0.216∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.358 0.253∗∗∗
(10.35) (4.33) (1.28) (12.27)
MBHC 0.000837 0.0235 0.0648 0.00279
(0.12) (1.01) (1.49) (0.41)
OBHC 0.00323 0.0333 0.0452 0.00448
(0.55) (1.47) (1.20) (0.79)
MRG 0.0806∗∗∗ 0.0847∗∗∗
(4.81) (15.68)
ACQ 0.00572∗ -0.0231 -0.0317 0.00408
(1.71) (-1.09) (-0.87) (1.22)
Constant 0.511∗∗∗ 0.204 0.394 0.421∗∗∗
(5.97) (0.65) (0.84) (5.48)
Bank FE yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.228 0.310 0.311 0.232
N 19793 1059 529 21381
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Table 11: Definition of Variables.
Variable Name Variable Definition
Managerial Ability
MA Managerial Ability is computed according to the method of Demerjian, Lev,
and McVay (2012). Specifically, we compute profit efficiency for each bank
using Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and regress the resulting efficiency
score on a set of bank-specific variables. The residual from this regression
is that component of efficiency that cannot be explained by bank-specific
factors and hence should be attributed to management.
Liquidity Creation
CATFAT Liquidity creation is measured following Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) ap-
proach. Assets and liabilities are classified as to the ease, cost and time
with which they can be liquidated and assigned weights of 0, −12 and 12
so that maximum liquidity is created (destroyed) when illiquid assets are
financed by liquid liabilities and vice versa.
Risk-taking
T1R The tier 1 ratio calculated as tier 1 capital divided by risk weighted assets
using Basel II rules.
LAGTA Liquid assets over gross total assets
ZIND Z-Score calculated as return on assets plus capital to asset ratio, divided
by the (previous three years’) standard deviation of return on assets
Bank-specifics
CREDRSK Ratio of risk weighted assets to gross total assets
SDROA Standard deviation of return on assets calculated using three bank-year
observations
EA Equity over asset ratio
BKSIZE Log of gross total assets
CE Cost efficiency score derived from SFA
MBHC Dummy variable, set to one if a bank is part of a multibank holding company
and zero otherwise
OBHC Dummy variable, set to one if a bank is part of a onebank holding company
and zero otherwise
MRG Dummy variable, set to one if a bank has been involved in at least one
merger in the last three years and zero otherwise
ACQ Dummy variable, set to one if a bank has been acquired in the last three
years and zero otherwise
Bank Market Characteristics
BKHHI Weighted Herfindahl-Hirschmann index calculated using a bank’s deposits
in a given market as weights
BKMSML Market share of medium and large banks faced by a bank in its markets,
calculated using a bank’s deposits in a given market as weights
BKPDNS Population density of a bank’s markets calculated using a bank’s deposits
in a given market as weights
BKPOP Population of a bank’s markets calculated using a bank’s deposits in a given
market as weights
BKICHG Income change of a bank’s markets calculated using a bank’s deposits in a
given market as weights
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